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White tears, white rage 
Victimhood and (as) violence in mainstream feminism 
 
Alison Phipps, University of Sussex 
 
Using #MeToo as a starting point, this paper argues that the cultural power of mainstream 
white feminism partly derives from the cultural power of white tears. This in turn depends 
on the dehumanisation of people of colour, who were constructed in colonial ‘race 
science’ as incapable of complex feeling (Schuller 2018). Colonialism also created a 
circuit between bourgeois white women’s tears and white men’s rage, often activated by 
allegations of rape, which operated in the service of economic extraction and exploitation. 
This circuit endures, abetting the criminal punishment system and the weaponisation of 
‘women’s safety’ by the various border regimes of the right. It has especially been utilised 
by reactionary forms of feminism, which set themselves against sex workers and trans 
people. Such feminisms exemplify what I call ‘political whiteness’, which centres 
assertions of victimhood: through these, womanhood (and personhood) is claimed to the 
exclusion of the enemy. Through legitimating criminal punishment and border policing 
and dehumanising marginalised Others, claims to victimhood in mainstream feminism 
often end up strengthening the intersecting violence of racial capitalism and 
heteropatriarchy. 
 
*** 
 
'You ought to be ashamed of yourself,' said Alice, 'a great girl like you,' (she might well 
say this), 'to go on crying in this way! Stop this moment, I tell you!' But she went on all 
the same, shedding gallons of tears, until there was a large pool all round her, about four 
inches deep and reaching half down the hall (Carroll 1865, p18).  
 
 
1. Introduction: feminism in testimonial culture  
 
I’ve been called one of the first to speak out. No. I was the first. I called the New 
York Times. I blew it wide open, not them. They won the Pulitzer and I’m the one 
hard-up for money. It’s disgusting. (Rose McGowan in Gilbey 2019). 
 
The above quote comes from a 2019 interview in the Guardian newspaper, in which 
actor Rose McGowan disputed how credit for the exposure of Harvey Weinstein had 
been assigned. As her comments intimate, being the first to speak out is powerful in the 
testimonial cultures that characterise neoliberalism and its heroic, individuated self 
(Ahmed and Stacey 2001, p4). Speaking out can attract political dividends: in earlier work 
(Phipps 2016, 2020) I have theorised experience, especially of the traumatic kind, as a 
form of investment capital in what Ahmed (2012[2004], p45) calls the ‘affective 
economies’ of testimonial culture. Trauma can be disclosed or ventriloquised to generate 
further capital in the form of feeling, creating political gain. Being the first to speak out 
can also have material rewards, particularly in media ‘outrage economies’ that thrive on 
controversy and scandal.    
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#MeToo could perhaps be seen as the paradigm feminist movement of the testimonial 
age. However, it did not start out that way: it began in 2006 as a programme of work 
created by Black feminist and civil rights activist Tarana Burke, to help survivors of sexual 
violence, particularly young women of colour, find pathways to healing.
i
 The phrase ‘me 
too’ denoted Burke’s central principle of ‘empowerment through empathy’ which 
focused on marginalised survivors connecting and supporting each other (Murray 2017). 
Eleven years later, this phrase went viral as a hashtag, following a tweet by actor Alyssa 
Milano and the input of other white celebrities and politicians (Tambe 2018). Analysis 
of over 600,000 #MeToo posts showed they varied between personal stories and support, 
posting articles, discussing alleged perpetrators, and general commentary (Manikonda et 
al. 2018). However, perhaps supported by the declarative nature of the hashtag and the 
testimonial media cultures it was shared in, #MeToo was generally viewed as a movement 
of mass disclosure. 
 
Testimony has been fundamental to public feminisms around sexual violence (Serisier 
2018). Putting our trauma ‘out there’ is a means to escape being consumed by it ‘in here’ 
(Lorde in Desmoines and Nicholson, 1978, p13), a way of reclaiming subjectivity and 
control after it has been stolen through sexual violation (Serisier 2018, p11). However, 
the mass public testimony of #MeToo both echoed and departed from feminist 
consciousness-raising principles. As Tarana Burke herself argued, social media 
movements do not automatically provide aftercare; in an interview with Elle, she said: ‘I 
[worried] people would say “me too” and then not go to a rape crisis centre’ (Murray 
2017). The demographics of the movement also diverged from Burke’s focus on more 
marginalised survivors supporting one another.  
 
Most of the key figures in the viral iteration of #MeToo were Western, white and middle 
or upper-class (Tambe 2018), reflecting the makeup of mainstream feminism and 
especially its media iterations.
ii
 As Black actress and sexual violence activist Gabrielle 
Union said on Good Morning America, ‘I think the floodgates have opened for white 
women’. Union’s use of floodgates as a metaphor is significant. #MeToo was described 
as a ‘flood’ of stories of sexual assault by CNN, CBS and CBC, and a ‘tsunami’ on CNBC, 
in the Times of India, the New York Times and the US National Post (see Phipps 2020, 
p37, 71). These characterisations evoked trauma on a massive scale, representing the 
movement as a collective weeping, a release of (white) tears.  
 
 
2. The ‘wounded attachments’ of political whiteness 
 
In her 1995 book States of Injury, Wendy Brown argued that progressive movements 
tended to coalesce around ‘wounded identities’ that demanded recognition and 
protection, whether from hate speech, harassment or violence. For Brown (1995, p55), 
such politics not only reified said identities but ontologised trauma, producing a ‘politics 
of recrimination and rancor’ with deep investments in victimisation and suffering. 
Second-wave feminism in particular, Brown argued, had instantiated ‘woman’ as an 
identity based on injury. She interpreted feminist consciousness-raising and the ‘speak 
out’ as akin to Foucault’s (1978) ‘modern confessional’ in their production of accounts 
that could be appropriated by punitive (and therapeutic) state governmentalities. 
Solidifying the ‘truth’ of women’s experience through ‘speaking out’, she contended, was 
not necessarily liberation (Brown 1995, p42).  
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As I have argued elsewhere (Phipps 2019), the ‘wounded attachments’ Brown attributed 
to feminism are likely to be those of middle-class whiteness, given the domination of both 
first and second waves of mainstream feminism by bourgeois white women (Ware 1992, 
p18). By ‘mainstream feminism’, I largely mean Anglo-American public feminism. This 
includes media feminism (and some forms of social media feminism), institutional 
feminism, corporate feminism and policy feminism. This is not a cohesive and unified 
movement, but it has clear directions and effects. Building on HoSang (2010), I call the 
modus operandi of this feminism ‘political whiteness’. This goes beyond the implicitly or 
explicitly ‘whites first’ orientation of most politics dominated by white people: it has a 
complex affective landscape involving attachments to the self (often the wounded self) 
and to power (often in the form of the state). These attachments produce a number of 
dynamics: narcissism; alertness to threat (which in white women’s case is often 
sexualised); and an accompanying need for control. Political whiteness characterises both 
mainstream feminism and the backlash against it, as they ‘battle it out’ (Banet-Weiser 
2018, p1) on the contemporary cultural stage.  
 
Victimhood is central to these battles (Banet-Weiser 2018, p4). Women’s sexual 
victimisation has been at the forefront of recent mainstream feminist campaigns, 
exemplified by actions such as the Women’s March as well as the viral iteration of 
#MeToo. Responding to this, the backlash has been preoccupied with who the real 
victims are. One of its central claims is that ‘feminism has gone too far’ (Nicholas and 
Aguis 2017, p31), that men are now fearful because harmless touching has been defined 
as abuse. These narratives are bolstered by broader stories of white victimhood which 
have underpinned Brexit, the election of Trump, and the elevation of other far right 
figures and parties worldwide (Corredor 2019). 
 
 
3. Crying ‘white-lady tears’ 
 
On International Men’s Day 2019, Good Morning Britain host Piers Morgan broadcast 
a monologue comparing middle-class white men to endangered rhinos. ‘Yes, we do need 
a day’, he said. ‘We are now the most downtrodden group of men in the world’. 
Assertions such as this, from the heart of the backlash, have been given short shrift by 
white feminists who often use the idiom of ‘male tears’. In 2014, writer Jessica Valenti 
tweeted a picture of herself wearing a T-shirt with the slogan: I BATHE IN MALE 
TEARS (Phipps 2020, p69). However, white feminists have been slower to acknowledge 
our own tendency to be lachrymose, which is often an attempt to avoid accountability in 
response to criticism by women of colour. Historically, bourgeois white women’s power 
has been based on ideas of virtue and goodness (Ware 1992, pp37-38): as Hamad (2019, 
p105) argues, this makes being criticised for bad behaviour deeply threatening. White 
women can also be so invested in our oppression as women that we resist addressing our 
privilege as white (Accapadi 2007, p208).  
 
Robin di Angelo (2011, p57) argues that white people in general exist in a state of fragility 
‘in which even a minimum amount of racial stress becomes intolerable, triggering 
defensive moves’. di Angelo has been critiqued for her individualised focus on self-
improvement rather than structural change (Jackson 2019). However, an understanding 
of whiteness as the performance of structural supremacy still involves fragility, whether 
this is the angry brittleness of hegemonic white masculinity or the ‘delicacy’ of white 
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bourgeois femininity (the source of its power). If anger is the main expression of white 
power in a masculine register, tears are its feminine one. ‘Tear’, as a both a noun and a 
verb, has multiple meanings: bourgeois white womanhood both tears (in the sense of 
becoming torn or damaged), and consequently tears (in the sense of tearing up), easily. 
This ‘damsel in distress’ evokes a protective response: and simultaneously, colonial 
archetypes of people of colour as aggressive and frightening come into play. This is the 
pretext on which white men, enraged, tear the place apart.  
 
Hamad (2019, p105) terms this Strategic White Womanhood, a historical dynamic 
which endures in the contemporary, in various forms. She recounts a relevant incident 
in 2018 involving Cambridge professors Mary Beard and Priyamvada Gopal. Beard was 
challenged by Gopal and others over a tweet she had posted on allegations of sexual 
abuse by Oxfam staff in Haiti and elsewhere. ‘I do wonder how hard it must be to sustain 
civilised values in a war zone’, it said. In response to criticism, Beard tweeted a picture of 
herself crying; afterwards, Gopal in particular was the target of racist attacks (Hamad 
2019, pp102-105). For Hamad (2019, p25, 229), this exemplifies the abusive relationship 
women of colour have with white womanhood. When the going gets tough, she argues, 
white women ‘turn their sanctioned victim status’ on women of colour. While privileged 
white women bathe in male tears, women of colour can drown in ours.  
 
Our sanctioned victim status shields privileged white women from accountability in 
interpersonal interactions and in the political sphere. In her discussion of the 2017 
Women’s March, Brittney Cooper (2018, p182) highlighted exit polls that found 53 per 
cent of white women voted for Trump, compared to 94 per cent of Black women who 
voted for Clinton (despite their reservations). Watching white women protest Trump’s 
election, she wrote, when white women were partly responsible for it, felt like ‘an exercise 
in white-lady tears if I ever saw one’. Read in a structural way, the Women’s March could 
be seen as an action that hid white women’s complicity in Trump’s success (Phipps 2020, 
p120) – in Hamad’s terms, Strategic White Womanhood writ large. 
 
In May 2019, Theresa May wept outside 10 Downing Street as she resigned the UK 
premiership. These tears did political work, creating amnesia in some quarters over 
May’s record as Prime Minister, and previously as Home Secretary. Perhaps most 
strikingly, domestic abuse charity Women’s Aid posted a (subsequently deleted) tweet 
thanking May for her service to women and survivors. This prompted a critical response: 
prior to her resignation, May had failed to guarantee that women’s refuges would not 
close as part of an overhaul of supported housing. In 2015, she had been accused of 
allowing ‘state-sanctioned’ rape and abuse of vulnerable migrant women at the Yarl’s 
Wood detention centre. Her government presided over the rollout of Universal Credit, 
the punitive benefits system that has made it more difficult for women to leave abusive 
relationships. It appeared that, for some, May’s tears washed these acts out of the picture 
(Phipps 2020, p70).  
 
In response to a picture of May crying, news anchor Eylon Levy tweeted: ‘this is such a 
haunting photo. Whatever you think about Theresa May's record as prime minister, it's 
impossible not to feel sorry for her as a person.’iii This attempt to separate the personal 
and political is central to white women’s tears as a strategic device. We demand to be 
treated as ‘just a person’ who should be granted the benefit of the doubt, who exists 
outside racialised structures and power relations even as our actions perpetuate them. 
However, while privileged white feminists deny the relationship between the personal 
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and the political in response to critique, in our own theory and politics this relationship 
(and in particular, our own personal experience or that of women like us) takes centre 
stage. This is more than just hypocrisy; it is white supremacy. Whether we deny or 
emphasise the relationship between the personal and political, white women’s tears 
enable us to centre ourselves and marginalise women of colour. 
 
In an article on #MeToo, Jamilah Lemieux (2017) commented: ‘white women know how 
to be victims. They know just how to bleed and weep in the public square, they 
fundamentally understand that they are entitled to sympathy’. Lemieux was not claiming 
the disclosures of #MeToo were not genuine; she was highlighting the power brought to 
mainstream feminism by the power of white women’s tears. White-lady tears, to use 
Cooper’s phrase: bourgeois white women’s tears are the ultimate symbol of femininity, 
evoking the damsel in distress and the mourning, lamenting women of myth (Phipps 
2020, p71), and it is likely that this power is not fully accessible to working class white 
women, who are often figures of classed disgust (Tyler 2008). While it might date back 
to the ancients, the power of bourgeois white women’s tears was solidified in the modern 
colonial period, as ‘women’s protection’ became key to the deadly disciplinary power 
that maintained racialised and classed regimes of extraction and exploitation.   
 
 
4. White tears, white rage, white personhood  
 
White supremacy produces both white tears and white rage, and colonialism relied on a 
circuit between bourgeois white women’s tears and white men’s punitive power. This was 
often activated by the vocabulary of rape: Indigenous, colonised and enslaved men were 
maimed and killed after allegations made by bourgeois white women (Ware 1992, p11, 
37). As Angela Davis (1981, pp106-111) argues, both mass rape of Black women and 
allegations of rape against Black men have been instruments of white supremacy (Davis 
1981, pp106-111). In earlier phases of capitalism, rape laws functioned to protect upper-
class men, whose wives or daughters (their property) might be violated (Davis 1981, 
p101). In the genocidally violent relations of theft, capture and chattel that characterised 
colonial capitalism, rape prohibitions took on similar meanings at the levels of 
community, nation and race.  
 
In colonial Australia, rape was a ‘violation of female purity’ punishable by death: 
politicians insisted this was necessary to keep Aboriginal and ‘disreputable’ (poor) white 
men under control (Kaladelfos 2012, p159). The vulnerable bourgeois white woman was 
central to accounts of insurrections such as the Indian Mutiny and the Morant Bay 
uprising in Jamaica (Ware 1991, pp39-42): fear of rape was fear of revolution. In the US, 
following the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, white Americans used lynching to 
terrorise and control Black people. Rape of a white woman was one of the most common 
pretexts for attacks on growing Black social and economic power (Ware 1992, pp179-
182). In 1921, white mobs (many of them deputised and/or given weapons by city 
officials) killed between 100 and 300 Black people and destroyed 1000 houses in 
Greenwood, Tulsa, after a Black man was falsely accused of assaulting a white female 
elevator operator. Greenwood Avenue had been known as ‘Black Wall Street’ because 
it was one of the most affluent African-American communities of the early 20
th
 century 
(Magidan 2001).  
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The story of Emmett Till is perhaps the best-known of this history of what Sharpe (2016, 
p15) calls the ‘ongoingness of the conditions of capture.’ 14-year-old Till was brutalised 
and killed by two white men in Mississippi in 1955, after Carolyn Bryant falsely accused 
him of ‘uttering obscenities’ and grabbing her by the waist. Jessie Daniels (2018) has 
called Bryant ‘the foremother of contemporary white women who call the police on 
Black people sitting in a Starbucks, barbecuing in a park or napping in a dorm’, acts that 
have also led to fatal violence (Sharpe 2016, p52). The 2020 Black Lives Matter protests 
following the police murder of George Floyd reiterated that Black lives are still the price 
of white affective security (Schuller 2018, p2), and Black death is still crucial to the 
operation of the white supremacist state (Sharpe 2016, p9). White women’s ‘safety’ is 
also central to contemporary border regimes, which purport to protect us from 
immigrants and traffickers but actually create the conditions for mass exploitation and 
abuse (Mac and Smith 2018, pp59-60, 75-76).  
 
Political whiteness involves a will to power: in the case of bourgeois white women, this 
was and is often achieved through performances of powerlessness. We exist at the 
intersections of capitalism, white supremacy and heteropatriarchy, with little control over 
the means of production (Lugones 2008, p15) but with raced and classed dominance that 
requires feminine submission. Like Penelope in Homer’s Odyssey, we fling ourselves on 
the floor and cry. This activates the settler’s and master’s revenge, now embodied in the 
necropolitical (Mbembe 2003) criminal punishment and border control that captures 
Black and brown people and/or leaves them to perish: what Sharpe (2016, p16) terms 
the ‘reappearance of the slave ship in everyday life’. This circuit between white tears and 
white rage means that the relationship between the personal and political in white 
feminism has always been corruptible or perhaps even inherently corrupt.  
 
In contrast to the damsel in distress, the woman of colour has had her innocence stripped 
by colonialism, often through rape (Hamad 2018, pp18-19). As Angela Davis (1981) 
argues, colonial ideas about Black sexual ‘savagery’ created both the notions of the Black 
man as rapist and the Black woman as un-rapeable, encased in the notion of Black 
people’s bodies as objects to which anything could be done (Sharpe 2016, p13). During 
#MeToo, the only allegations Harvey Weinstein publicly refuted were from actors Salma 
Hayek and Lupita Nyong’o: Hamad (2018, p55) argues that this was because brown and 
Black women are easier to discredit. Women of colour, and particularly Black women, 
are not able to politicise their pain in the way white women do: this both reflects and 
perpetuates their thingification (Césaire 1950, p42) and ‘abjection from the realm of the 
human’ (Sharpe 2016, p12).iv  
 
It is not just that the tears of white women are valued while those of Black women are 
dismissed. It is that race itself (and perhaps class, at least to a certain extent) is defined by 
the perceived capacity to cry, that the performance of bourgeois white emotion 
accomplishes the dehumanisation of people of colour. As Kyla Schuller (2018) has 
shown, in 19
th
 century sex and race ‘science’, ideas about sex difference (seen as a 
property of bourgeois whiteness) intermingled with ideas about feeling. This divided the 
‘civilised’ body into two halves: ‘the sentimental woman…and the less susceptible and 
more rational man’ (Schuller 2018, p16). The bourgeois white woman’s capacity to cry 
was fundamental to her dominant status, as was the capacity of her male counterpart to 
respond to her tears with action. Humanness came to refer to both an assumed capacity 
for feeling and the capacity to control it.  
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In contrast, Schuller argues, Black people were seen as driven by impulses and 
sensations. Other people of colour were defined differently, yet similarly stripped of their 
sensibilities: Asian people became ‘enervated’ and ‘stagnant’ remnants of the past, while 
Native people were ‘animated fossils destined to go the way of the dinosaurs’ (Schuller 
2018, p11). These racialised symbolics fitted material bodies to labour differently for 
capital accumulation. Communities of racialised people were drafted, appropriated or 
kidnapped from across continents for both free and enslaved labour, forced reproduction 
and coerced experimentation, ‘on the grounds that they lacked the nervous capacity to 
feel any harm’ (Schuller 2018, p14). The racialised construction of feeling also created 
the need to protect the refined, sensitive and civilised bourgeois white subject from the 
‘coarse, rigid and savage elements of the population suspended in the eternal state of 
flesh’ (Schuller 2018, p8).  
 
In the afterlives of colonialism and slavery (Hartman 2007, p6), these dynamics persist. 
Middle class white women are allowed emotions and inner worlds, while women of 
colour are not (Hamad pp18-19). ‘Women’s protection’ upholds the edifice of criminal 
punishment and the violence of the national border (Phipps 2020, p11, 79), while people 
of colour become an undifferentiated mass whose tragedies, like the ‘migrant crisis’, are 
often consumed and forgotten (Sharpe 2016, p33, 74-75, see also Chouliaraki 2006). The 
resistance of Black people and other people of colour is often ignored even by those who 
are in solidarity, or dismissed as ‘senseless rage’ by those who are not (Bailey 2016, pp1-
23). White feminism, with tears as its centrepiece, is a factor in this racial calculus 
(Hartman 2007, p6). Furthermore, some reactionary strands of white feminism have 
capitalised upon narratives around victimhood and ‘women’s safety’ and in doing so, have 
become entangled with the contemporary far right.  
 
 
5. Feminists and the far right 
 
Reactionary feminisms, which coalesce around debates about sex workers’ rights and 
transgender equality, magnify the political whiteness of the mainstream and deliberately 
withhold womanhood and personhood from marginalised Others. Trans women are 
defined as ‘biological men’ while trans-exclusionary feminists are ‘adult human females’. 
Sex workers’ rights are juxtaposed with ‘women’s safety’, a manoeuvre in which the 
womanhood of sex workers is implicitly denied. This reasserts the normative 
economically productive body and reproductive sex. It conjures up colonial sex 
difference and bourgeois white womanhood as a symbol of moral order, set against the 
racialised and enslaved inhabitants of colonised and settled territories and the multi-
racial, ‘dangerous, immoral, and libidinal lower classes’ of the metropolis (Tyler 2008, 
p22). In this mentality, neither the ‘unnatural’ or the ‘unrespectable’ woman can ever be 
a real woman (Phipps 2020, p151).  
 
Victimhood, disclosed or ventriloquised, is central to these dynamics. In sex industry 
debates, harrowing narratives of suffering in pornography, prostitution and trafficking are 
used to implore people to ‘listen to survivors’ (Phipps 2016, pp309-310). These traumatic 
experiences are deployed within a colonial feminist framework (Ahmed 1992, p151) that 
demands border regimes and regulation policies sex workers oppose. The latter includes 
the Nordic Model of client criminalisation, and the prohibition of online advertising of 
sexual services: both have been shown to drive sex work underground, creating additional 
risk (Mac and Smith 2018). Projects to ‘get’ the pimps and traffickers do not target the 
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conditions – austerity, Fortress Europe, criminalisation itself - that create these figures in 
the first place. Nevertheless, when sex workers highlight this they are often defined as 
‘happy hookers’ who do not care about ‘women’s safety’ (Mac and Smith 2018, p14).  
 
Trans-exclusionary (or ‘gender-critical’) feminism similarly relies on accounts of sexual 
victimisation, set alongside a construction of trans women as predatory and essentially 
male. This pertains in discussions about trans women’s inclusion in women’s services 
and other spaces such as prisons, toilets and changing rooms (Serano 2013, p31). Trans 
women are made responsible for acts of violence committed by cis men, through 
narratives that naturalise the penis as violence and stick this organ to the trans woman via 
an intrusive and violent obsession with her surgical status (Phipps 2016, p311). 
Simultaneously (like other reactionary politics), trans-exclusionary feminism monsters 
trans women in general through publicising isolated incidents of violence committed by 
members of this group. The effect of both tactics is to repackage trans equality as 
predation: trans women’s demands to be recognised as women are reinterpreted as 
invasion and sexual threat.  
 
This reactionary feminist politics exemplifies the threatened bourgeois femininity of 
political whiteness. This is magnified in claims to be silenced and oppressed, which have 
been made by reactionary feminists (or men speaking on their behalf) in high-profile 
media outlets (Phipps 2020, p150). The narrative – that reactionary feminists are the real 
victims but their voices are not being heard – achieves several aims. It disseminates 
reactionary feminist ideas; it deploys Strategic White Womanhood to avoid 
accountability; it uses the device of white women’s tears to deny humanity to the Other. 
Reactionary feminists seize womanhood – and personhood - while sex workers become 
uncaring ‘happy hookers’ and trans women become shadowy threats. We see the 
weeping Madonna versus the unfeeling whore. We see the weeping survivor versus the 
menacing predator. Neither sex workers or trans women are entitled to complex feelings 
or to claim victimisation on their own behalf.  
 
Many of the most marginalised sex workers and trans women are women of colour, and 
Black feminists have also suggested that symbolically, these categories are associated with 
Blackness. As Sharpe (2016, pp21-22, 31) writes, Black people are already transgendered 
and queered, because binary gender is a construction of bourgeois and colonial 
whiteness. Bourgeois whiteness appears in sharp relief against the Black people 
‘ungendered’ in the hold of the ship (Spillers 2003, p206), and the ‘future criminals’, 
‘prostitutes’, ‘thugs’ and ‘birthers of terror’ that supplant girls and boys, men and women, 
in the anagrammatics of Blackness (Sharpe 2016, p47, 55).
v
 Hartman (2019) highlights 
the persistent association of Blackness with prostitution, grounded in notions of 
commodification that link enslaved people and sex workers, and colonial constructions 
of Black sexual ‘excess’ (see also Davis 1981, p106).  
 
Flavia Dzodan views trans-exclusionary feminism in particular as a settler-colonial 
mentality in its attempt to solidify the sex/gender/sexuality system (Rubin 1975) which 
intertwines with race and class in the division of labour through difference (Skeggs 2019, 
p32). Its essentialist mindset reflects how ‘the coloniser could name us, assign us a place 
and a role in the hierarchies’vi – a mindset exemplified in the ledger that rendered Black 
people illegible as humans, which reappears in contemporary border regimes (Sharpe 
2016, p30). The reactionary feminist emphasis on social purity (a campaign against the 
managed prostitution zone in Leeds was openly named ‘save our eyes’) also summons 
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colonial ghosts: the bourgeois white women missionaries, social reformers and 
philanthropists sent forth to ‘civilise’ people of colour and working class white people 
both overseas and in the metropolis (Hartman 2019, p24, Ware 1992, pp149-150).  
 
Anti-trans and anti-sex worker feminisms continue the legacy of ‘respectable’ femininity 
as a tool of capitalist and colonial domination (see McClintock 1995, p47). They are 
complicit with the contemporary far right, which argues that countries should be invaded, 
borders closed, walls built and marginalised people incarcerated, to ‘keep (white) women 
safe’. There are significant, and growing, financial and other material associations 
between reactionary feminists and far right groups, which exploit the circuit between 
white tears and white rage. For instance, Hands Across the Aisle’s mission statement 
reads:  
We are radical feminists, lesbians, Christians and conservatives that are 
tabling our ideological differences to stand in solidarity against gender 
identity legislation, which we have come to recognize as the erasure of our 
own hard-won civil rights.
vii
 
Through this initiative, trans-exclusionary feminists associate with the US National 
Catholic Bioethics Center, the American College of Pediatricians (an anti-LGBT group 
not to be confused with the American Academy of Pediatrics) and Tucker Carlson’s 
website the Daily Caller.  
 
For me, these alliances bring to mind Patricia Hill Collins’ article ‘Learning from the 
Outsider Within’, in which she reproduces a quote from an interview conducted by John 
Gwaltney with 73-year-old Nancy White. 
My mother used to say that the black woman is the white man's mule and 
the white woman is his dog. Now, she said that to say this: we do the heavy 
work and get beat whether we do it well or not. But the white woman is 
closer to the master and he pats them on the head and lets them sleep in 
the house, but he ain't gon' treat neither one like he was dealing with a 
person (Hill Collins 1986, pS17).  
As Hill Collins (1986, pS19) explains, the white woman may feel that she is ‘part of the 
family’, when in fact she is a ‘well-cared-for pet.’ Bourgeois white women achieve 
personhood in relative terms, largely through the dehumanisation of people of colour. 
We may experience the necropolitical rage of white men as vicarious power in the form 
of protection, when ultimately we too are property, to be abused at will (so perhaps not 
always that well-cared-for) but defended violently from the Others. Our tears do not often 
hold powerful white men accountable (such as Brett Kavanaugh, for example, or Donald 
Trump), but are used by them in the service of domination and control. Reactionary 
feminism appears content for women to be championed by men who reserve their own 
right to perpetrate abuse. In this way, it bolsters its proponents’ race and class supremacy, 
and all women’s gendered subordination.  
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Conclusion 
 
'I wish I hadn't cried so much!' said Alice, as she swam about, trying to find her way out. 
'I shall be punished for it now, I suppose, by being drowned in my own tears! 
That will be a queer thing, to be sure! However, everything is queer to-day.' Just then 
she heard something splashing about in the pool a little way off…it was only a mouse that 
had slipped in like herself (Carroll 1865, p23). 
 
The cultural power of white tears, which underpins movements such as the viral iteration 
of #MeToo, is a racialised and classed power which relies on the illegibility of women of 
colour, and Black women especially, as victims. To paraphrase Christina Sharpe (2016, 
p20), it is not just that Black woman are excluded from mainstream feminism. The 
constitution of emotionality in opposition to Blackness means they may be ‘the ejection, 
the abjection, by, on, through, which’ the testimonial politics of the movement constitutes 
itself (see also Hartman 2019, p90). Victimhood is dressed in white. The ‘sanctioned 
victim status’ (Hamad 2019, p25) of bourgeois white women especially can be turned on 
women of colour in interpersonal interactions: this evokes less Alice’s pool (which in the 
end, turned out quite benign) and more a salty grave.  
 
Structurally, bourgeois white women’s tears support what Sharpe (2016, p16) calls 
‘reappearances of the slave ship’: ‘protecting (white) women’ fuels the necropolitics of 
criminal punishment and the border regimes of Fortress Europe, North America and 
other parts of the world. These tears enter a world in which marginalised people are 
disposable, whether they are Black people killed by police, migrants left to starve or 
drown (Sharpe 2016, pp43-44, 54), or trans people and sex workers (many of them 
people of colour) disproportionately left to survive outside bourgeois families, 
communities and the law. The circuit between white women’s tears and white men’s rage 
means that because we cry, marginalised people can die. As some forms of reactionary 
feminism exploit this circuit in their engagements with the far right, their narratives of 
victimhood can themselves be understood as violence. The ship, then, stays afloat: 
captained by white men, but suspended in a pool of white women’s tears.  
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i
 Sometimes I refer to women of colour as a group (for instance, when racism treats them as such), and 
sometimes I describe specific experiences and archetypes, for instance related to Black people. There is 
also great diversity within racialised communities: however, my arguments often pertain to their symbolic 
construction (see also Ware 1992, pxii).  
ii
 There were many interventions into #MeToo which had an intersectional and decolonial focus: for 
instance, by the Alianza Nacional de Campesinas and similar groups of domestic and other service workers. 
The hashtag trended worldwide and was associated with a number of movements including the 65-day 
Garima Yatra (dignity march) of around 5,000 Dalit and Adivasi survivors in India.  
iii
 Tweet posted by @EylonALevy at 10:44am, 24 May 2019.  
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iv
 The Muslim woman, who is always-already victimised (Ahmed 1992, Ware 1992), is an exception: 
however, she is not allowed to speak. Her feelings are ventriloquised by white women who act as saviours, 
to gain platforms and power for ourselves (Phipps 2020, pp74-75).  
v
 Anagrammatical blackness, for Sharpe (2016, p45-48), is the process by which ‘grammatical gender’ falls 
away: ‘girl doesn’t mean “girl” but, for example, “prostitute” or “felon”, boy doesn’t mean “boy” but “Hulk 
Hogan” or “gunman”.’ This degendering also, paradoxically, supported the violent exploitation of enslaved 
women’s reproductive labour, which ‘turn[ed] the womb into a factory producing blackness as abjection 
much like the slave ship’s hold’.  
vi
 Tweet posted by @redlightvoices at 9:49am, 4 February 2019.  
vii
 I have written extensively about these alliances in my (2020) book Me, Not You – see especially chapter 
six.  
